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Introduction

The NEBULA Future Internet Architecture (FIA) project is focused on a future
network that enables the vision of cloud computing [8,12] to be realized. With
computation and storage moving to data centers, networking to these data centers must be several orders of magnitude more resilient for some applications to
trust cloud computing and enable their move to the cloud.
An example application we envision is to use cloud computing as the basis for
a personal health monitoring and advisory service. Sensors, data repositories,
and interactive components could input parameters to the cloud – such as food
consumed and exercise regimen followed. The challenge is in extending such a
service to more advanced inputs and outputs, including real-time data communications to and from medical devices, such as continuous glucose monitors and
insulin pumps. This application requires both high reliability and data privacy,
or, seen from a network security perspective, all of the “CIA” security properties
of Conﬁdentiality, Integrity and Availability.
The NEBULA approach is organized into three architectural thrust areas:
a reliable routing system and data center interconnect (NCore), a data plane
that enables policy enforcement (NEBULA Data Plane, NDP), and a novel approach to control plane architecture (NEBULA Virtual and Extensible Networking Techniques, NVENT) that allows users to control the network conﬁguration
from the edge.
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Fig. 1. The NEBULA Future Internet Architecture model

The NEBULA FIA project is characterized by three attributes. First, the
architecture is comprehensive, in that it addresses a large set of complex and
diﬃcult problems. Second, the approach is completely new, and therefore in
many aspects could not be “extended” or “composed from” any existing work:
invention was required before integration could begin. Third, the comprehensive
nature of the architecture demanded a large team with a diversity of skill sets
and approaches to sub-problems.

2

NEBULA as a Network Architecture

A network architecture deﬁnes the structure of the network and its components. In NEBULA, we started from the basic position that cloud computing,
where computation is performed on large network accessible data centers, would
transform networking. Concerns about security properties such as conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability would inhibit the use of cloud computing for new
applications unless a new network architecture is designed.
To illustrate what the key challenges are, we discuss our example application
– closed-loop control of blood glucose levels for an insulin-dependent diabetic –
in a bit more detail. We can presume availability of some devices that already
exist, and that the patient is equipped with some of these: a continuous glucose monitor, camera, exercise monitor and insulin pump. The cloud application
would determine the current glucose level, monitor what was being eaten, monitor the exercise activity level, and make an insulin infusion recommendation.
This application would have strict conﬁdentiality requirements (it is very personal healthcare data), integrity requirements (incorrect dosages can be harmful)
and availability requirements (a lack of network availability might, at the limit,
cause physical harm).
NEBULA addresses these challenges with the three architectural thrust areas
named in the introduction. Some basic decisions included the use of packetswitching and a network structure with hosts interconnected by a graph of links
and store-and-forward routers. Paths are composed of sequences of links and
routers, and will have performance dictated by the capacities of the components
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Fig. 2. Host 1 and Host 2 are connected by two physical paths

as well as their current workloads. These are basic properties NEBULA shares
with the conventional Internet.
2.1

Today’s Internet

However, the Internet makes some additional design decisions that inﬂuence
its architecture. The ﬁrst of these is that the routing algorithm attempts to
ﬁnd the single best path between two endpoints. The second of these is that
the routers use a best-eﬀort policy, allowing a packet to reach its destination if
possible. Third, routers make dynamic decisions about the best path, allowing
for unreliable links and routers under the assumption that the network graph
is reasonably connected. Finally, the conventional Internet’s evolution occurs at
the end-points (hosts), rather than in the network.
For instance, consider the simple example network in Figure 2. There are nine
routers (the red and green balls marked with Ps and Qs), and two interconnected
hosts. These could represent either two edge nodes or – more relevant to the
NEBULA vision – an edge host and a cloud data center. The red routers have a
richer (but more complex) transit network, and the red and green access networks
provide redundant access networking. In this network, the Internet would be
unable to exploit the redundancy in the paths, and would be unable to enforce
any policy (e.g., one related to health care data security and privacy). Diagnosis
and policy enforcement would have to be performed at the endpoints.
2.2

NEBULA

NEBULA’s support of cloud computing [8,2,12] and highly reliable applications [5] forces it to be diﬀerent in several respects. First is the realization that
data center networks [7] and their interconnection are both diﬀerent in structure than a conventional Internet and require routers that are far more reliable
than today’s core routers [8]. Our NEBULA Core (NCore) of ultra-reliable Core
routers interconnecting data centers are equipped with new fault-tolerant control software [2]. We exploit path diversity for resilience, and have originated
new ways to detect/resist failures [24,18] and malicious attacks [11], including
resilient interdomain protocols. In addition, we are examining implications of
(and for) resilience solutions on policy and economics.
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Fig. 3. A NEBULA perspective on the network from Figure 2

Consider Figure 3, a redrawn version of Figure 2 with NEBULA components
added; Q3 and Q4 exhibit diﬀerent security policies. The NEBULA network
architecture is resilient: If any single router fails, the application is still left with
a usable path it can exploit. Speciﬁcally, if Q1, P1, Q6, or P3 fail, access is
preserved via P1, Q1, P3, and Q6, respectively. For policy enforcement, if Q3 or
Q4’s policy is incompatible with the application or the cloud service, either Q4 or
Q3 can be used, or the green path can be exploited if it is policy-compliant. Using
network provenance [42], failure detection [18,41] and network debugging [20],
problems can be rapidly diagnosed and repaired, even while the services continue
operating.

3

NEBULA Future Internet Architecture Integration

The ﬁrst phase of NEBULA required invention of new approaches and elements
in areas such as router architecture, data center networking, interdomain networking, network control, and network security. Further, it required work by
scholars of regulatory policy and economics seeking to understand the implications of the cloud and NEBULA’s changes to networking (including reliable
routers and routes chosen with constraints set by ﬂexible policies that reﬂect
desires of parties such as users, cloud providers, internet service providers and
web servers).
Ultra-reliable Future Internet Router Example (FIRE): This is the
router component [2,10] of NCore. To ease sharing and implementation (see
Section 4), an open source implementation is being used, and the team at the
University of Delaware has been experimenting with RouteBricks [13] on two
high-performance PCs (supplied by Cisco Systems) equipped with 10 Gbps cards.
Ultra-reliable data center or ISP network: This is the data center interconnect to the NCore routers; it is used to access data and compute cycles in
the data centers. The interconnect must be ultra-reliable – for example, accesses
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Fig. 4. Illustration of NEBULA Elements as an Integrated Architecture

to the stored glucose records and healthcare data must not fail, and there should
be some end-to-end performance isolation [23]. It also makes sense to manage
data ﬂows to the NCore routers with a redundant [30] and load-balanced interconnect [33,34,7].
Ultra-reliable Interdomain service: This is primarily focused on the Nebula Data Plane (NDP) and several alternatives we have created [29,31] for its
implementation. It is the primary locus for policy issues such as security, privacy,
fault-tolerance, and more complex and specialized policies. This is a particular
challenge, as the policies must be relevant in spite of a federated structure for
NEBULA that we expect to emerge as a result of an emergent marketplace of
oﬀered network services.
Policy Control: This is primarily focused on NEBULA Virtual and Extensible Networking Technology (NVENT). It must deﬁne an API for service
requests [32] – in particular, requests for a speciﬁc policy. Approaches [38] developed and matured during Phase I are being melded into an NVENT that
provides a service abstraction consistent with our model of network support
for the cloud. In particular, the Declarative Networking approach [28] will be
used to form networks of policy compliant paths when needed by applications.
Since much of the path information is cacheable, discovery can be asynchronous,
and path lookup can be very quick. There are also extensive eﬀorts in diagnosis [42,21,1], veriﬁcation [37,25,35,36,3,41,19], detection [18] and debugging [20].
Economic and Policy Implications of NEBULA: This work [9,40,26,27]
is primarily focused on the implications of the NEBULA project on economic
and regulatory properties. The Phase I work examined economic implications
of dramatically increased router reliability and some of the policy impacts of
cloud computing. As we move towards an integrated architecture with policy
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enforcement, policy and regulatory issues abound. For example, TorIP [29] prevents visibility into packet destinations or content, and the economic and policy
implications of this must be understood. Another example is the complex tussle between ﬁne-grained policy enforcement and the desire by some for network
neutrality.
A variety of interesting research questions have become apparent. We expect
to resolve these as the integration eﬀorts proceed. We brieﬂy discuss two here.
First, the control plane must query policy servers for an ICING-based
NDP [31], and the query model of declarative networking must be supported
to create policy-compliant routes for the NEBULA control plane. ICING [31] is
one alternative for NDP, and ICING enforces policy by having ISPs check the
work of other ISPs, while TorIP [29] enforces policy by preventing ISPs from
gathering the information needed to do eﬀective policy discrimination. Transit
as a Service (TaaS), if used as NDP, uses a third approach to policy enforcement,
randomized test packets that cannot be distinguished from regular traﬃc.
Second, the application interface to specify policy has not been ﬁnalized, and
the relationship between the policy-enforcing forwarding plane and the NCore
routers remains somewhat in ﬂux. We expect to investigate this via the integration of Serval [32] and Declarative Networking [28] that will comprise NVENT.

4

NEBULA Configuration and Operation

If we are to have highly trustworthy networking for the cloud, we must have
highly trustworthy interdomain paths, and these in turn require highly reliable
intradomain paths and services. To realize the latter, we are pursuing enhancements of RouteBricks (to build FIRE), the use of Quagga, and the addition of
fault-tolerant protocols for intradomain networking.
Consider two scenarios where the NEBULA architecture’s resilience and policy
mechanisms would be applied. In Scenario 1, the U.S. Department of Defense
wishes to acquire a high-assurance path over the Future Internet, and this path
must traverse only trusted networks. Further, since adversaries might choose to
attack the path, the network must not only be highly available (i.e., no single
point of failure), it must also be DoS-resistant and tolerate Byzantine faults.
In Scenario 2, outpatient medical monitoring is performed by software running
at a data center; to support this scenario, both high assurance and predictable
bandwidth are required.
A variety of goals can be abstracted from these scenarios – for instance, organizations need to be able to contract for end-to-end paths with explicit promises
from each organization along the path to convey the traﬃc, no third party must
be able to disrupt the traﬃc, and so forth. In our view, the model of the Internet
being provided by multiple organizations will persist.
For all of this to work, that is, for a user or organization to specify a policy
for what it wants from the network, and for a Future Internet Service Provider
to specify its policy of what it is willing to provide, the need arises for protocols for the following components: (1) a “name service,” by which users locate
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the services they need; (2) “path advertisements,” through which constituent
networks gather and convey what each is willing to provide; (3) “assured path
provisioning,” whereby network resources are sought and bound for use in a given
communication; (4) “veriﬁable data forwarding,” whereby traﬃc is sent on network routes that veriﬁably comply with the policies of the assured path; and (5)
“fault diagnostics,” which detects and/or identiﬁes faulty network components.
4.1

Policy Configuration

There is clearly a very large number of possible policies, and these policies come
from multiple sources – for example, end-users, their organizations and the ISPs
bearing their traﬃc in the middle of the network. Some applications need path
control, some need resource reservations, some need failover guarantees, etc. This
requires work at the API level, in NVENT (using Serval [32] as the basis for this
API) to determine how a client can ask for certain properties. A second issue is
at the protocol level in NVENT, where mechanisms for an ISP advertising its
willingness to oﬀer certain properties must be determined.
A policy server will have zero or more policies. The default policy is to
drop traﬃc, sometimes called “deny by default”. Policies are assumed to be
dynamic (changeable) but we assume they are changed infrequently, and thus
are cacheable. In our initial architecture, we expect that users and prototype
applications will want policies that are easy to state; for instance, a policy indicating HIPAA compliance could simply be stated as HIPAA=yes. A policy server’s
policies can be queried by clients and consent servers; a path is constructed from
consenting servers.
In choosing paths, the policy logic must not only know which paths are permitted, it must also know which paths are available. This kind of knowledge
requires detection support from the network [18].
Some of our work is in the direction of removing the ability for ISPs to discriminate against certain types of traﬃc (e.g., TorIP), although that might also
be accomplished by other means, e.g., regulation or testing. ICING assumes the
ability of ISPs to veto paths, which means either delegation of path-granting authority or extra RTTs. Depending on some of those choices, the policy options
are somewhat diﬀerent.
4.2

Path Setup

A user or application speciﬁes policy requirements for the path they wish to use
– for instance NEBULA PATH=HIPAA:AES256:T BOUND 5. The application speciﬁes
a destination or service (see also Section 4.4).
For an ICING-based [31] NDP, when this speciﬁcation is received, the system
checks a cache for a cached compliant path to the destination or service. If such
a path is available, try to obtain consent to use the path, perhaps with cached
proofs of consent if obtaining consent is expensive. If nothing is cached, or there
is no consent for a cached path, the system would iterate requests for consent to
consent servers. The end result is that NEBULA will either establish and cache
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a path, or will fail with an error. For TorIP [29]/TaaS, the assumption is that
advertisements will be long-lived; there is no path-veto, so advertisements (in
contrast to ICING) are simple and composable, albeit less expressive.
4.3

Forwarding

NEBULA users (either senders, receivers, or service providers) can require that
speciﬁc network resources be bound to a network path (cf. e.g. Scenario 2 above).
To verify compliance, packets can carry secure “markings” of consent, as well as
a secure reference to the resources allocated to that connection. This marking
strategy might be implemented via Icing’s cryptographic “proofs of consent”
and “proofs of provenance”, or via the cryptographic sealing implied by Onion
Routing in TorIP. Below we outline the key steps for the case of veriﬁable data
forwarding in Icing.
Senders mark their packets using the cryptographic tokens included in the
proofs of consent they obtained when the connection is established. When processing an incoming packet, an NDP edge router checks whether from the packet’s
marks it can evince that the packet is “permitted” (it carries proper proof of
consent) and “travelled right” (it carries proper proof of provenance). The last
check requires that previous routers had updated the “marks” on the packet
whenever an ISP (“realm”) boundary was crossed. Thus, before forwarding the
packet to the next node on the path, an NDP edge router “blesses” the packet
(or peels oﬀ an onion layer in the case of TorIP).
4.4

Naming

In Serval [32], Service IDs are resolved via a Service Abstraction Layer (SAL).
Both TorIP [29] and ICING [31], alternatives for NDP have appropriate solutions
for mapping human-readable names into network-usable information. In TorIP
a name server resolves a name (e.g., google.com) to a set of (ISP,ID) pairs.
The ID identiﬁes a mailbox where a client can rendezvous with a server or
service. A client ﬁnds a path connecting ISP-advertised triples. In ICING, DNS is
augmented by policy enforcement, by forcing paths to have consenting elements.
For example, DNS client resolution of www.foo.com requires consenting paths
to servers for “.”, “.com”, “foo.com”, etc.
Proofs of Consent (PoCs) are cacheable by clients, so in the common case,
only resolving the most speciﬁc name would require interaction with consent
servers.

5

Conclusions

NEBULA is a Future Internet Architecture intended to provide secure and resilient networking to support present and future applications of cloud computing.
At the time of writing, the work on NEBULA is still ongoing, but we have made
signiﬁcant progress in a number of essential areas. NEBULA is a comprehensive
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architecture, and a number of novel technologies have already been developed
for it; however, due to space constraints, we can only give a brief overview of
the key building blocks here. For details, we refer the interested reader to the
papers we cite below.
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